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Abstract 
Less restrictive product market policies are crucial in promoting convergence to higher 
levels of GDP per capita. This paper benchmarks product market policies in Romania 
to those of the OECD countries by estimating OECD indicators of Product Market 
Regulation (PMR). The PMR indicators allow a comprehensive mapping of policies 
affecting competition in product markets. Comparison with OECD countries reveals 
that Romania’s product market policies are less restrictive of competition than most 
direct comparators from the region and not far from the OECD average. Nonetheless, 
this achievement should be interpreted in light of the fact that PMR approach 
measures officially adopted policies. It does not capture implementation and 
enforcement, the area where future reform efforts should be directed if less restrictive 
policies are to have an effective impact on long-term growth prospects. Part I : a 
comparative analysis of Romania’s PRM and Inward-oriented Policies.  
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Introduction 
On January 1, 2007, Romania became a member of the European Union. This 
achievement was in part made possible by a substantial reform effort that has allowed 
Romania to make impressive progress towards long-term stability and sustained 
growth in the last six years. 
Nonetheless, the income gap with the new member states of the EU remains large. In 
order to sustain growth and improve competitiveness, a second generation of reforms 
has been put in place to help the country’s successful integration in EU and global 
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markets. A cornerstone of this reform agenda is the implementation of less restrictive 
product market policies that enable firms to put resources, both capital and labor, to 
their most efficient use. 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of Romania’s performance in product 
market regulation (PMR). The approach used relies on a methodology developed by 
the OECD (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005), that measures the degree to which 
domestic policies inhibit or promote competition. The data – which are derived from a 
self-reported survey – is policy-focused as opposed to perception based (or based on 
market outcomes). It is available for OECD members and Brazil. Data for Romania 
were first collected in 2002 in the context of an OECD country study on Romania 
(OECD 2002a) and then again in early 2006.  
The key finding is that Romania’s product market policies appear to be less restrictive of 
competition than most direct comparators from the region and not far from the OECD 
average (as estimated on the basis of data collected in 2003). This result is particularly 
impressive when compared to its earlier score: OECD (2002a), employing an earlier 
version of the PMR methodology, found that product market policies in Romania were 
among the most restrictive compared to OECD countries. This implies that over the past 
few years Romania has engaged in a comprehensive reform effort across a wide array 
of product market policies. Such striking improvement is in line with the findings of other 
surveys such as Doing Business, which shows Romania to have improved its ranking 
from 71 out of 155 countries in 2005 to 49 out of 175 in 2006. 
There are, however, two important caveats to this otherwise impressive achievement. 
The first is that the PMR approach measures officially adopted policies. It does not 
capture implementation and enforcement. In fact, interviews with business association 
suggest a significant gap between officially adopted policies, on the one hand, and 
implementation and enforcement, on the other. While Romania has achieved 
impressive results in terms of having laws that are more conducive to private sector 
development, the lack of a greater effort in terms of implementation and enforcement 
would substantially reduce the impact of the policies adopted in recent years that 
could hurt the competitiveness of the Romanian economy in the longer run.  
The second is that the analysis compared Romania in 2006 with OECD countries in 
2003 (the latest year in which a PMR survey was conducted). This does not detract 
from the remarkable progress Romania has made and certainly allows for a relevant 
comparison between Romania and other countries of the region just prior to their 
joining the EU. However, it does imply that Romania’s excellent performance leaves 
no room for complacency. Most OECD countries have actively continued to improve 
their product markets over the last three or four years. As such, the present paper 
overestimates how Romania ranks relative to competitors today.  
The present paper provides a detailed look at the various components of product 
market regulation and suggests areas in which further progress could be made, at 
least with respect to official policies. Some steps to improve implementation are also 
proposed. These include (i) greater political commitment at the highest level to take 
the lead in application and enforcement of rules and regulations; (ii) changes in the 
institutional architecture of the government to improve oversight and coordination; and 
(iii) implementation of measures to enhance the capacity of the public administration, 
especially its lower echelons, to support the reform agenda.   Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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We now turn to a presentation of the PMR methodology and a discussion of the 
choice of benchmarks, before presenting the results of the benchmarking exercise, 
looking first at inward oriented policies before briefly discussing outward oriented 
policies (which, as of January 1, 2007, are largely governed by EU rules and 
agreements). The last section concludes with some suggestions for next steps. 
The PMR Methodology 
A regulatory environment propitious to competition in product markets is widely believed 
to have positive repercussions on long run economic performance (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2003) and productivity convergence (Conway et al. 2006a and 2007). This 
may occur by promoting a more efficient allocation of resources both across and within 
sectors (Nickel 1996). A more competitive environment may also stimulate innovation 
and technological diffusion, thus enhancing dynamic efficiency (Aghion et al., 2001). 
Product market regulation (PMR) is measurable through a methodology developed at 
the OECD relying on the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire. The methodology 
and key findings of the PMR for OECD countries are presented in Nicoletti et al. 
(1999) and Conway et al. (2005). The PMR indicators summarize information on 
economy-wide and industry-specific regulatory provisions.  
The PMR indicators are designed to reflect regulations that have the potential to 
restrict competition in areas where competition is viable. By construction, they have a 
number of features which make them useful not only for analysis, but, more importantly, 
for policy advice, since they allow to pinpoint specific policies that hamper competition in 
product markets. First, PMR indicators are focused on enacted policies and not on 
outcomes, implying that they are ‘objective’, in that they are not based on opinion 
surveys. Second, since the summary PMR indicator is constructed as the average of 
well defined components, PMR scores can be related to specific underlying policies, 
thus providing precise inputs in the phase of policy recommendation. Finally, PMR 
indicators focus on regulatory measures that affect the economy at large and can 
therefore be considered as comprehensive measures of regulatory restrictiveness. 
Their advantages notwithstanding, PMR indicators are not designed to capture informal 
regulatory practices nor the effective enforcement of regulations, since they are only 
concerned with formal compliance with a number of criteria. 
Data were collected for Romania for the purpose of the present exercise, covering four 
of the six “sections” of the OECD product market regulation database.
1 The first section 
deals with general regulatory policy issues, concerning public ownership; market access 
and competition issues; market structure and vertical relationships in utilities and other 
network industries. The second section covers regulatory and administrative policies, 
such as processes and capacities in the public administration. The third section covers 
regulation in transportation industries, focusing on market access, business conduct, 
and market structure in road freight, railways and passenger air travel. The final section 
covers regulation in retail distribution, focusing on the regulatory environment, industry 
behavior and prices. Information from Doing Business 2006 was used for a fifth section 
of the PMR - administrative burdens on startups. 
Figure 1 
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The PMR indicator system 
     
Economic regulation
Administrative regulation
1.The numbers in brackets indicate the weight given to each lower level indicator in the calculation of the higher level indicator immediately above it. 
The weights were derived by applying principal components analysis to the set of indicators in each of the main regulatory domains (state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, economic regulation and administrative regulation). The same approach was used to derive the weights used 
to calculate the indicators of inward and outward-oriented policies and the overall PMR indicator. The principal components analysis was based on 
the original 1998 data.
2. Two indicators from the 1998 version of the PMR indicators ('Special voting rights' and 'Control of public enterprise by legislative bodies') have been combined into this indicator.
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Source: Conway et al. (2005). 
 
The structure of the PMR system is shown in Figure 1. The system is composed of 16 
basic or ‘low-level’ indicators, each capturing a specific aspect of the regulatory 
regime as described in Box 1. The basic indicators are progressively aggregated in 
more comprehensive policy areas. The highest level of aggregation corresponds to 
the summary measure of product market regulation in the country.  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Box 1. The 16 low-level PMR indicators 
These indicators cover a wide range of product market policies and include:  
INWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
State control: Public ownership 
 Scope of public enterprises: this indicator measures the pervasiveness of state 
ownership across business sectors as the proportion of sectors in which the state has an 
equity stake in at least one firm. 
  Size of public enterprise: reflects the overall size of state-owned enterprises relative to 
the size of the economy. 
 Direct control over business enterprises: measures the existence of government 
special voting rights in privately-owned firms, constraints on the sale of state-owned equity 
stakes, and the extent to which legislative bodies control the strategic choices of public 
enterprises.  
State control: Involvement in business operations 
 Price  controls: reflects the extent of price controls in specific sectors. 
  Use of command and control regulation: indicates the extent to which government uses 
coercive (as opposed to incentive-based) regulation in general and in specific service 
sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Regulatory and administrative opacity  
  Licenses and permits systems: reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and ‘silence is 
consent’ rules for getting information on and issuing licenses and permits. 
  Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflects aspects of 
government’s communication strategy and efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative 
burden of interacting with government. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Administrative burden on corporations 
  Administrative burdens for corporations: measures the administrative burdens on the 
creation of corporations.
1 
  Administrative burdens for sole proprietors: measures the administrative burdens on 
the creation of sole proprietor firms.
2 
  Sector-specific administrative burdens: reflects administrative burdens in the road 
transport and retail distribution sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Barriers to competition 
  Legal barriers: measures the scope of explicit legal limitations on the number of 
competitors allowed in a wide range of business sectors. 
  Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope of exemptions to competition law for public 
enterprises. 
 
OUTWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
Barriers to trade and investment: Explicit barriers  
  Foreign Ownership barriers: reflects legal restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity in 
public and private firms and in the telecommunications and airlines sectors. 
  Tariffs: reflects the (simple) average of most-favoured-nation tariffs. 
  Discriminatory procedures: reflects the extent of discrimination against foreign firms at 
the procedural level. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Regulatory barriers  
  Regulatory barriers: reflects other barriers to international trade (e.g. international 
harmonisation, mutual recognition agreements). 
 
Source: reproduced from Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005 
The indicators are calculated on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative 
information obtained from questionnaire answers. Qualitative data are assigned a 
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numerical value that allows ordering each of the possible responses to a given 
question. Quantitative information is ranked by subdividing it into categories based on 
a system of thresholds. The coded information is then normalized over a scale of zero 
to six. These data are then aggregated into basic or ‘low-level’ indicators by assigning 
subjective weights to the various regulatory requirements. Given the normalization of 
the basic data, all the low-level indicators also have a scale of zero to six, reflecting 
increasing restrictiveness of regulatory areas.
1 A detailed description of the low level 
indicators is presented in the Annex.  
Basic indicators are then aggregated into broader regulatory domains. Higher level 
indicators are calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower level 
indicators. The attribution of lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and 
the weights used in the aggregation, are based on principal component analysis 
(Nicoletti  et al., 1999). At the highest level of aggregation the overall indicator of 
product market regulation summarizes the restrictiveness of the regulatory framework 
in the product market. The structure of the PMR system, with progressive levels of 
aggregation, has the advantage of allowing a decomposition of higher-level indicators, 
with an increasing degree of detail, into the values of the more disaggregated 
indicators, each corresponding to specific regulatory provisions. 
Choosing Benchmarks 
The most obvious benchmarks for Romania are Bulgaria (for which data are available 
for 2006), and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are also OECD 
members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic collectively 
referred to as the OECD CEE). The fact that the data are from 2003, when the OECD 
CEE were at about the same point as Romania in 2006 relative to their accession to 
the EU, makes them even better benchmarks. Nevertheless, when interpreting 
comparative results, it should be kept in mind that comparators are likely to have 
made further progress since 2003. 
Additionally, comparison with Romania’s 2002 PMR results provides an indication of 
the progress made in product market policies. However, since the 2002 PMR was 
estimated using an earlier methodology, the 2006 and 2002 scores for Romania are 
not strictly comparable. Nonetheless, both the order of magnitude and the relative 
standing of Romania clearly show an impressive drive towards adoption of product 
market policies that are less restrictive of competition in recent years.
 2 
Extension of the benchmarking exercise to Brazil, Mexico and Turkey offers a broader 
perspective on other middle income countries (MICs) with different historical 
experiences. Finally, comparison with the OECD or high income EU15 countries helps 
identify longer-term objectives for policymakers.
3  
                                                             
1 The calculation of low-level indicators, including the weights used, is based on Conway et al. 
(2005). 
2 See Nicoletti and Scarpetta (1999) for a description of PMR 1998 results. Conway et al. (2005) 
re-estimate PMR 1998 indicators using the PMR 2003 methodology and show that orders of 
magnitude and country rankings remain virtually unchanged. 
3 The EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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These benchmarks are used in the graphs. Romania’s score relative to the full set of 
countries (30 OECD members in 2003, Brazil in 2004 and Bulgaria in 2006) is shown 
in Appendix I for all PMR indicators.  
The Romanian Context 
Until 2000, Romania was one of the poorest performing economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The turnaround in 2000 was preceded by a protracted and precipitous 
decline in GDP, a peaking of the poverty rate to 36 percent, and inflation of 54 percent 
per year. EU accession aspirations and the opening of official entry negotiations with the 
EU in December 1999 spurred Romania’s commitment to reforms. This led to significant 
macroeconomic consolidation and impressive growth in recent years. 
As a result of the reforms, the economy has been growing at a robust 5 to 6 percent 
per year over the last six years. The main drivers for this growth have been 
investment and exports - and occasionally domestic consumption - that responded 
strongly to improved confidence in banks and macroeconomic stabilization. Inflation 
declined from above 40 percent in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2006, the lowest level since 
the start of the transition. Fiscal consolidation, characterized by a cut in public 
expenditures of around 4% of GDP, allowed for a reduction in both inflationary 
pressures and the consolidated budget deficit. The latter shrank from 4.1 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to 1.7 percent in 2006. In addition, a combination of sustained growth 
and external migration permitted a substantial decrease in registered unemployment, 
down to around 5 percent of the labor force. 
The EU accession process also set the stage for a broad and sustained structural and 
institutional reform agenda. Privatization of commercial companies picked up, 
especially in banking and the energy sector, though it slowed down somewhat in 
2006. Foreign direct investment (FDI) substantially increased after 2000, with inflows 
exceeding 5-6 percent of GDP per year recently. Institutional and governance reforms 
advanced, with the first generation measures, focused on the establishment of the 
legal framework and the redesign of the institutional architecture of the public sector, 
either adopted or in the process of being implemented. 
Important steps were also taken to upgrade the regulatory framework for businesses, 
remove administrative barriers and enhance the business climate. A major step 
forward was the adoption by the government, starting with 2001, of an annual Action 
Plan to remove administrative barriers to businesses.
1 The implementation of the 
Action Plan, updated annually, is overseen by a working group representing 
stakeholders, and its results are measured through surveys. This has led to the 
simplification of administrative and regulatory procedures and the decrease of the 
transaction costs for business entry and operation. As a result, Romania was ranked 
as the second most dynamic reformer in the world by the World Bank 2007 Doing 
Business report it terms of improving the legal and regulatory framework for business.  
These remarkable achievements notwithstanding, important aspects of the regulatory 
environment still need to be improved. This is true with regard to the quality of the 
rules and regulations, but more so with respect to their efficient enforcement. 
Business surveys suggest that sizeable regulatory obstacles to resource allocation 
                                                             
1 This was supported by a program with the World Bank (the PSAL and subsequent PAL 
programs). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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remain, unnecessarily increasing the transaction costs for companies and hampering 
job creation. Some of these will be further documented in the paper. 
A central element of the regulatory reform agenda to be pursued by Romania is the 
continued implementation of less restrictive factor and product market policies and, 
even more so, the strengthening of the institutional framework for their effective 
implementation. This would encourage a more efficient allocation of resources and 
improve labor productivity. This is especially important given the significant gaps that 
Romania has in terms of incomes and productivity with EU members and the 
demographic trends laying ahead. Romania entered the EU with an estimated per 
capita income level of about 35% of the average for EU-15.
1 In addition, employment 
and participation rates, albeit improving recently, remain among the lowest in the EU. 
Evidence suggests that the reforms are paying off and that Romania is gradually, but 
constantly, catching up with the EU. 
Benchmarking Production Market Policies 
in Romania 
Enhancing competition in product markets has been found to positively affect GDP per 
capita by providing incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more productive 
activities, increase innovation and technological diffusion. In addition, less restrictive 
regulations may positively affect employment by reducing the rents that some firms 
extract from overregulation and force firms to expand their activities
2.  
Benchmarking product market regulation has proved to be a useful tool for monitoring 
the performance of policies and institutions in OECD countries and for identifying 
specific policy gaps, thus offering the opportunity to benefit from the experience of 
other member states. Two surveys have been conducted so far collecting data for 
1998 and 2003. Results from these surveys point to a convergence in product market 
policies across OECD countries, with substantial improvements achieved by countries 
that originally exhibited relatively restrictive product market regulations, such as 
Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and 
Spain (Error! Reference source not found.) Substantial improvements in easing 
product market policies have been also achieved among EU15 countries where the 
average PMR score fell from 2.1 in 1998 to 1.4 in 2003. While this reflects the 
increasing harmonization of EU common market rules, the PMR benchmarking may 
have been instrumental in fostering this improvement. 
                                                             
1 Eurostat. 
2 Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005).  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Figure 2 
Product Market Regulation among OECD Countries, a Comparison 











































Source: Conway et al. (2005). Note: the 1998 data were re-based to be made more 
comparable to the 2003 data, given the change in methodology. This explains the 
slight differences in the data for 1998 between Figure 2 and Figure 3.a.  
 
This positive effect is very much noticeable in Romania. In 2002 it ranked towards the 
bottom of the league of the 28 countries for which the overall PMR indicator was 
available. In 2006, out of 33 countries, Romania can confidently be ranked as one of the 
“middle of the road” countries; a remarkable progress by any measure (Figure 3.a and 
3.b). 
Figure 3.a 






































Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999) and OECD (2002a). Note: Data refer to 2002 for 
Romania and 1998 for other countries. Methodology changed somewhat in 2003 so 
the ratings are not strictly comparable between Figures 3.a and 3.b. For details on the 
change see Conway et al (2005). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 3.b 



















































































































Product market regulation 




Source: Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005) and, for Bulgaria and Romania, World Bank 
estimates based on information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian authorities and 
Doing Business in 2005. Note: the values refer to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 
2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  
Note: Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania and 2003 for all other countries. 
The confidence intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level 
indicators to generate a distribution of overall PMR indicators for each country. The 90 
per cent confidence intervals are calculated from that distribution. Indicator values for 
the 'relatively liberal' and 'relatively restrictive' countries are significantly different at 
the 90 percent level of confidence (Conway, Janod, Nicoletti, 2005). 
 
 
Today, rules and regulations governing Romania’s product market policies are less 
restrictive than most other middle income countries. Even relative to its closest 
comparators, Bulgaria in 2006 and the OECD countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe in 2003, Romania appears to be among the less restrictive countries, 
positioning itself slightly above the OECD and EU averages (Figure 4). 
Figure 4  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. OECD CEE 
include Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic. The values refer to 
2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable.  
 
We now turn to an analysis of the various components of the PMR indicator, in order 
to examine in greater detail some of the drivers of this excellent performance, but also 
to identify remaining sources of restrictiveness of product market regulation. A useful 
approach in doing so is to decompose the indicator into inward and outward oriented 
policies. The former include policies and regulations that determine the degree of 
state control and barriers to entrepreneurship, while the latter reflect policies and 
regulations that affect barriers to trade and investment. Detailed description of the 
basic indicators included in the indicators of inward and outward oriented policies 
follows in the next sections. 
In general, average performance seems better in all countries for outward- than for 
inward-oriented policies (Figure 5). This is certainly due to the requirements imposed 
by international agreements - such as the WTO charters, and, for EU countries, 
membership of the European Union - which are more binding in matters concerning 
trade and foreign direct investment. Greater reform challenges, as well as greater 
cross-country variation, lie with the regulations that fall under the category of inward-
oriented policies. Within this general framework, Romania’s product market 
regulations appear to be more restrictive of competition than the OECD and EU 
averages for outward oriented policies and around the OECD and EU averages for 
inward oriented policies. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 5 
Inward and Outward Oriented Policies 














































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I.  
 
The fact that Romania positions itself around the EU average for inward oriented 
policies suggests that it has already met most of the requirements of the acquis 
communautaire. More generally, the great progress observed since 2002 in inward-
oriented policies can be attributed to both the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire (e.g. competition policy), and to implementation of less restrictive 
policies in areas that are subject to domestic discretion. This indicates that the 
government has been diligent in complying with international commitments in domains 
that are often controversial from the standpoint of gathering sufficient domestic 
consensus. 
As for outward-oriented policies, the data, hence the ranking and score, reflect 
policies in place as of the spring of 2006. A number of these have changed by the 
mere fact of Romania joining the EU and therefore becoming governed by EU trade 
policies and agreements. Inward and outward oriented policies and the underlying 
indicators are discussed in details below.  
Inward-oriented Policies 
In order to identify the drivers of Romania’s progress since 2002, inward-oriented 
policies can be decomposed into two broad categories: indicators of state control and 
barriers to entrepreneurship (Figure 6).  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Figure 6 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship and State Control 
a. Barriers to Entrepreneurship  b. State Control 
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Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I. 
 
Barriers to entrepreneurship (such as barriers to competition, regulatory and 
administrative opacity, and administrative burdens on start-ups) which were already 
low in 2002, have since declined further in 2006, thus placing Romania in a better 
position than all comparator groups, including other middle income countries, pre-
accession Central European countries, as well as the OECD average.  
Visible but still limited progress has been made in the area of state control, where 
Romania still lags behind the OECD and EU averages and far from the performance of 
its more direct comparators, such as the Slovak Republic in 2003. Nonetheless, 
Romania’s disengagement from state control since 2002 mirrors the evolution of state 
control in the OECD, where countries that had relatively restrictive policies in 1998 have 
succeeded in reducing the extent of state control in 2003 by removing price controls and 
reducing reliance on coercive, as opposed to incentive-based, regulations.  
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
Barriers to Competition 
In terms of barriers to competition (as measured by licenses and permits requirements 
and antitrust exemptions) Romania’s performance is comparable to both the rest of 
the EU and other MICs (Annex Table A1.3). This is largely due to Romania’s diligence 
in incorporating EU rules and practices in national legislation. This resulted in the 
elimination of antitrust exemptions for state-owned enterprises (Câmpeanu et al., 
2003). In this regard Romania fares very well and even better than EU15 and the 
average for the OECD countries (Figure 7).  
On the other hand, Romania’s performance in terms of other legal barriers to 
competition, in the form of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors 
allowed in certain business sectors, appears to have worsened relative to 2002. This Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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could well be due to the change in methodologies. Whatever the reason, this appears 
to be one of the few categories in which Romania does not rank well. As in many 
other OECD and EU countries, this result appears to be driven by the existence of 
legal restrictions to entry in network and utilities sectors, such as rail, road and air 
transport infrastructure; electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply; 
and gas production, transmission, distribution and supply; and telecommunications 
(see Table A2.10 for details). 
Figure 7 
Barriers to Competition 
a. Legal Barriers (Licenses and Permit 
Requirements)  










































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I. 
 
Regulatory and Administrative Opacity  
Romania scores well in terms of regulatory and administrative opacity (Annex Table 
A1.3). It has made substantial progress in the simplification of licenses and permits, 
(Figure 8a) while maintaining its 2002 best practice positioning in terms of 
communication and simplification of rules and procedures (Figure 8b). The indicator 
captures aspects of the government’s communication strategy and its efforts to reduce 
and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with the government. 
This reflects the substantial efforts made by Romania in streamlining licensing regimes 
since the previous PMR survey (OECD 2002a). Indeed, the simplification of licensing 
procedures has been a central theme of the country’s Action Plans for improving the 
business environment. Important milestones in the simplification process include: the 
reduction of the number of products and services requiring licensing; the removal of 
some barriers to free trade, the elimination of some import-export licenses; the 
simplification of licensing procedures for retailers through the elimination of ex-ante 
licenses, the use of voluntary assumption of responsibility statements, the strengthening 
of ex-post control and monitoring; the establishment of the one-stop shop and the 
elimination of some licenses; the adoption of the Silent Approval Law (2003), which 
establishes a maximum period of 30 days for the approval of a certain set of licenses 
and authorizations from the moment of the application.  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Figure 8 
Regulatory and Administrative Opacity 


















































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I. 
 
Romania has also implemented a number of reforms to improve the communication of 
rules and procedures to affected parties. The annual Action Plans to improve the 
business environment contain communication components whose aim is to enhance 
the interaction between the administration and the business community, some of 
which are discussed in Box 2.  
 
Box 2. Romania’s efforts at simplification and better communication  
of rules and regulations 
Measures adopted as part of the Plans include the development of a government site targeting 
communication with businesses (www.mdp-mediuafaceri.ro), which contains updated information 
relevant for companies, such as changes in legislation, explanation of implementation norms for 
laws, links to relevant ministries and government agencies, funding opportunities. 
Most of the important pieces of legislation impacting upon the business climate, such as the 
Silence-is-consent Law, the Decisional Transparency Law, the Free Access to Public Information 
Law, also benefited from broad media dissemination campaigns, including TV, radio and 
newspapers presentations, brochures and posters, direct free access telephone information lines to 
the government. Other traditional means of communication, such as meetings with relevant 
stakeholders, including businesses associations were broadly used, and company surveys were 
carried out, including by FIAS, to capture satisfaction with the changes and suggestions for further 
measures.  
To improve the interface between government and companies, an e-government site (www.e-
guvernare.ro) was established. The site allows businesses to access various forms and documents 
relevant for the interaction with the authority. A stakeholders group, which includes the most 
important business associations, oversees the implementation of the Action Plans 
Improvements in this domain are reflected in firm level surveys. For instance, BEEPS 
data suggest that the percentage of senior management time devoted to dealing with 
public officials in connection with regulation or access to public services has declined 
from over nine percent to less than two percent between 2002 and 2005.
1 
                                                             
1 The 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys ask the question “What percent of senior management’s 
time in 2001 was spent in dealing with public officials about the application and interpretation 
of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain access to public services?” Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Nonetheless, despite these substantial efforts and achievements, the communication 
strategies of the authorities only partially succeeded to reach the mass of companies 
impacted upon. Many firms still complain about a gap between the provisions of the 
rules and their practical implementation, while others continue to find the access to 
relevant information difficult. Surveys suggest, for example, that many companies 
have not even heard about the Silent Approval law.  
Perhaps as a result the improvements in the rules and regulations were not reflected 
in perception-based indicators. Thus, Doing Business 2007 ranks Romania 116
th out 
of 172 countries in terms of dealing with licenses, even though Romania does well in 
the overall ease of doing businesses. A similar finding is reported by the BEEPS 
surveys that report that 40% of firms consider licenses to be a problem for doing 
business in the country. This is substantially worse than among comparator countries, 
and does not appear to have improved markedly since 2002 (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9 
Business Licenses as a Problem for Doing Business  
(Percent of Firms Indicating Business Licenses and Permits  
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Source: EBRD-WB BEEPS, 2005.  
Surveys and discussions with companies suggest that, while a limited number of firms 
seem to be severely affected; most of the difficulties arise for those requesting 
production and construction licenses. The procedures for obtaining a construction 
authorization and the certificate for urbanism seem to be long. The procedures to 
subsequently connect buildings to utilities, mainly gas and electricity, are also long 
and relatively costly. This paper recommends continuing the simplification of these 
procedures, as this is critical to the smooth implementation of projects financed from 
the EU structural and cohesion funds, especially in infrastructure and environment.  
  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Administrative Burdens on Start-Ups 
Romania’s policies in terms of facilitating the creation of new firms remain liberal 
relative to 2002, since administrative burdens are lower than among comparators for 
startups in general, and in specific service sectors, such as road transport and retail 
distribution (Figure 10). The indicator of administrative burdens for corporation 
measures the number of procedures, number of days, and the minimum capital 
required to start a limited liability company. 
Figure 10 
Administrative Burdens on Startups 
a. Administrative Burdens on Businesses  b. Sector Specific Administrative Burden 
0.8
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Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I.  
 
The burden on business creation is substantially lower than in other countries even 
the EU15 and the OECD. The number and duration of procedures, as well as the cost 
involved in starting a company is lower in Romania than in other middle income 
countries and on a par with the best practice of top performers in the EU, such as 
Ireland or the UK.  
This could, however, be partly driven by the fact that slightly different data and 
methods were used to calculate this indicator for Romania. A homogenization 
procedure was therefore necessary to make its score comparable to the other 
countries (see Table A2.8 for details). However, this excellent ranking is consistent 
with Doing Business’ data that rank Romania as the 7
th best country (out of 175) in 
terms of ease of starting a business (it was the 6
th in 2005).  
Romania’s rankings and good performance vis-à-vis the ease of starting a business 
reflect the continued simplification and reduction (down to five) of the company 
registration procedures, especially after 2004. These took central stage in three 
consecutive Action Plans (2004, 2005, and 2006) for the reduction of administrative 
barriers to entry and operation of businesses, and were part of the PSAL/PAL 
programs. The establishment of one-stop shops for firm registration played an 
important role in this progress. The measures implemented through the Action Plans 
followed the recommendations of two World Bank/FIAS reports (2002 and 2004).  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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 State Control of the Economic Activity 
Despite the decline in state control since 2002 (a trend that started in 1999), 
Romania’s performance still lags behind that of the OECD average and the EU 15. 
The gradual reduction of the state’s presence in the economy was a crucial element of 
the reform package associated with Romania’s EU pre-accession commitments. As a 
result, between 1999 and 2006, most of the commercial companies held in the portfolio 
of the privatization agency AVAS and in the banking sector were privatized. The energy 
sector was unbundled and important privatizations took place in electricity and gas 
distribution. The national oil company was also privatized, although the government 
retains a golden share in Petrom. In parallel, price liberalization in many sectors and the 
adjustment of energy tariffs reduced direct state involvement in services and improved 
the efficiency of resources allocation. Nevertheless, public enterprises still represent a 
substantial part of the economy and important energy generation companies, whose 
governance requires further improvement, continue to be managed by the state. Some 
energy tariffs have not yet reached import price parity.  
Figure 11 
Public Ownership and State Involvement in Business Operation 





















































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I. 
The two measures of state control in the PMR system are public ownership and state 
involvement in business operations (through price controls and coercive as opposed 
to incentive-based regulation). A look at Figure 11 reveals that Romania does not 
favorably compare with OECD and EU averages and is closer to the more restrictive 
pre-accession CEE with respect to both indicators.  
 
Public Ownership 
The aggregate indicator for public ownership covers size and scope of public enterprise 
sector, as well as direct control over business enterprises. Given that there is much 
more variation among EU15 or OECD countries for these indicators, we show the full set 
of comparators (Figure 12). We find that while the scope of the public sector is below the 
OECD average, both the degree of control exercised by the state over public enterprises 
and the size of the public enterprise sector are above the OECD average.   Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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The indicator for size is the largest in the sample, suggesting that the public sector 
remains significant in Romania. This may, however, be an artifact of the methodology: 
the approach follows a perpetual inventory method whereby an initial estimate of the 
public enterprise sector is reduced by an amount equivalent to the value of 
privatization receipts, as captured in the general government budget.  
This approach may be creating an upward bias in the computation of the “size” 
indicator for Romania. This is because a large segment of the Romanian economy 
was privatized through mass privatization (vouchers scheme) whereby the state did 
not receive any privatization proceeds. A large number of enterprises were acquired 
by domestic investors and, oftentimes, the price component of the deal was not the 
most important. Rather the divestiture of the large public industrial sector, with the 
quality of its assets often questionable, took primacy in the privatization process. 
Sometimes the privatized companies were allowed, as part of the privatization 
contract, to retain part of the privatization proceeds for restructuring and upgrades. In 
addition, several large privatizations deals, done with strategic investors, came to 
closure after the period of analysis covered in the present paper.  
Nevertheless, other sources confirm that the Romanian public enterprise sector remains 
important. Its size was estimated at around 30% of GDP in 2005 by the Romanian 
National Institute for Statistics (this has decreased in 2006, as several important 
privatization deals, especially in banking and energy, went through, such as that of the 
largest bank, BCR). As to its scope, it is also relatively wide given that the state holds 
important equity stakes in the largest firms in several sectors, such as electricity, gas, oil, 
banking (CEC bank), rail and road infrastructure and municipal utilities.  
Nonetheless, when looking at the scope of the public sector, which captures the 
extent to which the state holds equity stakes in the largest firm in different sectors, 
Romania is close to the OECD average and in a better position than several EU15 
countries (Figure 12b). Romania’s standing worsens when public ownership is further 
examined from the point of view of the pervasiveness of the formal control exerted by 
public bodies on public enterprises (Figure 12c). This result is driven by the presence 
of a golden share retained by the government in the oil sector. The golden share 
implies that important decisions can be taken only with a share of 75% of the board 
votes. The fact that the government controls more than 25% of the votes gives it the 
power to interfere with decisions concerning mergers or acquisitions, changes in the 
controlling coalition, acquisition of equity by foreign investors, choice of management 
or other strategic management decisions. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 12  
Public Ownership: Size, Scope and Extent of Control over Public 
Enterprises 





































































































































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values are 
for 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 
2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly comparable. 
For full data set see Appendix I. 
Involvement in Business Operation 
Regarding state intervention in the overall economy, the use of price controls has 
substantially decreased since the first phase of transition (World Bank 2004). (The 
variable measures the existence of price regulation or administrative control of prices  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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in air travel, road freight, telecommunications, and retail distribution sectors). 
However, prices for some utilities remain administered, especially in the energy 
sector, where tariffs are below import parity, despite significant adjustments taking 
place in recent years. Tariffs are also below cost recovery in the case of the least 
efficient electricity and heating generators.  
 
Figure 13 
State Involvement in Business Operations 
a. Price Controls  b. Use of Command-and-control Regulation 
0.4














































Source: See Figure 3. Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer 
to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. 
Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly 
comparable. For full data set see Appendix I. 
 
As to the use of command and control regulation, it remains significant, albeit to a 
lesser degree than the EU15 average and on par with the OECD average ( 
Figure  13). Overall, it is in line with comparator groups, although Romania’s 
performance is still far from that of the best practice countries (Australia, New 
Zealand, Slovakia to cite a few). The indicator reflects the extent to which government 
uses coercive (as opposed to incentive-based) regulation, in general and in specific 
service sectors (Box 3).  
Romania’s relatively good comparative score is driven by the fact that authorities have 
pursued a regulatory reform agenda driven by the highest OECD standards of 
regulatory quality, for instance by enshrining in legislation best OECD practices such 
as the considerations of alternatives to regulation as part of the process of adoption of 
new legislation. Nonetheless, weak implementation may defeat the purpose of the 
rules themselves. 
 Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Box 3. What the PMR survey means by  
“command and control” regulation 
 
The contrasting use of “command-and-control” and “incentive-based” regulation appear to 
have been brought into common usage by Schultze who wrote in a 1977 lecture about 
economic efficiency: “We tend to see only one way of intervening – namely removing a set of 
decision from the decentralized and incentive-oriented private market and transferring them 
to the command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy” (page 6) 
In this context, the PMR attempts to measure the extent to which the cost of new regulation 
is assessed, and whether alternatives are considered before implementing new regulations. 
About half of the indicator weights are allocated to the following two questions (the full make-
up of the indicator is provided in Annex table A2.5):  
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and non-
regulatory) before adopting new regulation. (Current answer: yes). 
Explanation. The use of a wide range of mechanisms for meeting policy goals, not just 
traditional regulatory controls, helps to ensure that the most efficient and effective 
approaches are used. Approaches may include green taxes and subsidies, voluntary 
agreements, information programs such as eco labeling, self-regulation, permit-trading 
schemes, and performance-based regulation (where a sector or industry must comply with a 
standard but can broadly choose how to meet it). Note that the question only refers to 
whether the obligation exists as a specific provision in a specific legislative act, not whether 
the spirit of it is in fact respected. A positive answer to the question would require the 
existence of a normative act explicitly ruling out regulation as the default option  
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation. (Current 
answer: no). 
Explanation. The regulatory process is governed by a standard procedure, outlining the 
steps to be taken to issue new regulation. For instance, the procedure may include binding 






Aghion, Philippe, Christopher Harris, Peter Howitt, and John Vickers. (2001). 
“Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation.” 
Review of Economic Studies, 68(3): pp.467-492. 
Campeanu, Virginia, Constantin Ciupagea, Joze Damijan, Donato De Rosa, Rumen 
Dobrinsky, Surd Kovats, Boyko Nikolov, and Silviya Nikolova. 
(2003). “EU Competition Policy and its Institutional Framework: A 
Survey of Transition Countries.” EU COMPPRESS, Institute of 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
(http://econ.core.hu/english/comppress/D5.PDF).  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
 Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 2/2008   27
   
Conway, Paul, Veronique Janod, and Giuseppe Nicoletti. (2005). Product Market 
Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003. OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper, No. 419. 
Conway, Paul, Donato De Rosa, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Faye Steiner. (2006a). 
Regulation, Competition and Productivity Convergence. OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper, No. 509. 
Conway, Paul, Donato De Rosa, and Giuseppe Nicoletti. (2007). Competition and 
Productivity Convergence in the Age of ICT: Evidence from OECD 
Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 
forthcoming. 
Gwartney, Jim, and Robert Lawson. (1997). Economic Freedom of the World Annual 
Report: 1997. Vancouver: Fraser Institute. http://www.freetheworld. 
com/download.html. 
Nickel, Stephen J. (1996). “Competition and Corporate Performance.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 104(4): 724-746. 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, and Stefano Scarpetta. (2003). “Regulation, Productivity and 
Growth: OECD Evidence.” Economic Policy, 36: 9-72, April. 
Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stefano Scarpetta, and Olivier Boylaud. (1999). “Summary 
Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to 
Employment Protection Legislation.” OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper, No. 226. 
Schultze, Charles. (1977). The Private Use of Public Interest. Brookings Institution. 
Washington, DC.  
World Bank. (2004). Country Economic Memorandum for Romania: Restructuring for 
EU Integration – the Policy Agenda. Report 29123-RO, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
***OECD. (2002a). Romania: Economic Assessment. OECD Economic Surveys, 
Paris, October. 
*** OECD. (2002b). Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to 
Regulatory Governance. Paris. 
 
*** OECD. (2005). OECD Economic Surveys. Brazil. Paris.Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 2/2008   28
   
Annex I 
Comparisons with Full Sample 
 
Table A1.1  
PMR 
 







Australia 0.9  0.9  0.9 
United Kingdom  0.9  1.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.0  1.4  0.4 
United States  1.0  1.2  0.8 
Ireland 1.1  1.4  0.6 
Denmark 1.1  1.3  0.9 
New Zealand  1.1  1.3  0.9 
Canada 1.2  1.2  1.2 
Sweden 1.2  1.5  0.9 
Luxembourg 1.3  1.6  0.8 
Japan 1.3  1.5  1.0 
Finland 1.3  1.7  0.8 
Belgium 1.4  2.0  0.5 
Netherlands 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Austria 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.3  1.5 
Germany 1.4  1.9  0.8 
Norway 1.5  1.9  0.9 
Korea 1.5  1.7  1.3 
Romania 1.6  1.8  1.4 
Portugal 1.6  2.0  0.9 
Spain 1.6  2.1  0.9 
Switzerland 1.7  2.1  1.1 
France 1.7  2.1  1.1 
Czech Republic  1.7  2.2  1.1 
Bulgaria 1.8  2.1  1.4 
Greece 1.8  2.2  1.3 
Italy 1.9  2.3  1.3 
Brazil 1.9  1.8  1.9 
Hungary 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Mexico 2.2  2.1  2.3 
Turkey 2.3  2.6  1.8 
Romania 2002  2.4  2.6  2.2 
Poland 2.8  2.9  2.5 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 
  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Table A1.2 
 State Control 
 
   State control  Public ownership  Involvement in business 
operation 
Australia 0.6  0.8  0.3 
Iceland 1.1  1.8  0.3 
United States  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Denmark 1.3 1.7  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.9  0.8 
New Zealand  1.4  1.9  0.8 
Japan 1.5  0.8  2.4 
Canada 1.7  1.7  1.5 
Korea 1.7  1.8  1.5 
United Kingdom  1.7  1.9  1.6 
Mexico 1.9  2.3  1.4 
Sweden 1.9  2.2  1.6 
Netherlands 1.9  2.5  1.2 
Austria 1.9  2.2  1.6 
Ireland 2.0  1.8  2.1 
Luxembourg 2.0  2.6  1.2 
Germany 2.2 2.8  1.5 
Switzerland 2.2  2.4  2.1 
Finland 2.3  3.2  1.3 
Belgium 2.4  2.2  2.6 
Brazil 2.4  2.1  2.8 
Czech Republic  2.5  3.0  1.9 
France 2.7  3.3  1.9 
Spain 2.7  2.7  2.7 
Portugal 2.7  3.1  2.2 
Norway 2.8  3.5  1.8 
Greece 2.8  2.4  3.3 
Turkey 2.8  3.1  2.5 
Romania 3.2 4.1  2.2 
Italy 3.2  3.8  2.3 
Bulgaria 3.2  3.5  2.8 
Hungary 3.3  3.8  2.6 
Poland 3.6  4.2  2.8 
Romania 2002  3.9  4.6  3.1 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Table A1.3  
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
 










Romania 0.5 0.7 0.1  0.6 
United Kingdom  0.8  0.7  1.2  0.4 
Canada 0.8  0.9  0.5  0.7 
Ireland 0.9  0.5  2.1  0.3 
Norway 1.0  1.0  1.2  0.6 
Sweden 1.1  1.2  1.1  0.6 
Finland 1.1  1.3  1.2  0.4 
Bulgaria 1.1  1.4  1.2  0.4 
Australia 1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5 
New Zealand  1.2  0.8  2.2  0.4 
United States  1.2  1.0  1.3  1.5 
Slovak Republic  1.2  1.9  0.7  0.3 
Luxembourg 1.2  1.8  1.1 0.1 
Denmark 1.2 0.5  2.1  1.7 
Portugal 1.3  1.7  1.2  0.5 
Brazil 1.3  1.5  1.4  0.6 
Romania 2002  1.3  1.3  2.1  0.1 
Italy 1.4  2.4  0.4  0.6 
Japan 1.4  1.9  1.2  0.6 
Hungary 1.4  2.3  0.4  1.1 
Germany 1.6 1.6  2.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.6  1.4  2.4  0.7 
Greece 1.6  2.6  0.6  0.5 
Spain 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.4 
France 1.6  1.9  1.3  1.4 
Belgium 1.6  1.7  2.2  0.6 
Austria 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.8 
Netherlands 1.6  1.6  2.5 0.6 
Korea 1.7  2.2  1.2  1.0 
Switzerland 1.9  1.7  3.1  0.7 
Czech Republic  1.9  2.3  2.3  0.5 
Mexico 2.2  3.1  0.4  2.9 
Poland 2.3  3.7  1.5  0.3 
Turkey 2.5  2.7  3.4  0.5 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Table A1.4 
Barriers to Trade and Investment 
 
   Barriers to trade and investment Explicit barriers  Other barriers 
Iceland 0.3  0.5  0.1 
Belgium 0.3  0.5  0.1 
United Kingdom  0.4  0.5  0.2 
Ireland 0.5  0.8  0.2 
Finland 0.6  1.0  0.2 
Germany 0.6  0.6  0.7 
Netherlands 0.7  1.0  0.3 
Spain 0.7  0.7  0.6 
Austria 0.7  1.0  0.2 
Luxembourg 0.7 1.1  0.2 
United States  0.7  1.1  0.2 
Norway 0.8  0.9  0.6 
Sweden 0.8  1.2  0.3 
Portugal 0.8  1.2  0.3 
Denmark 0.8  1.0  0.7 
New Zealand  0.8  1.3  0.2 
Australia 0.9  1.4  0.2 
Czech Republic  0.9  1.4  0.3 
Japan 0.9  1.4  0.3 
France 1.0  1.5  0.3 
Switzerland 1.0  1.5  0.4 
Canada 1.1  1.7  0.4 
Italy 1.1  1.7  0.4 
Greece 1.2  1.4  1.0 
Korea 1.3  1.9  0.4 
Bulgaria 1.3  2.0  0.4 
Romania 1.3  1.9  0.5 
Hungary 1.4  2.1  0.6 
Slovak Republic  1.6  1.6  1.5 
Turkey 1.7  2.5  0.6 
Brazil 1.9  2.3  1.5 
Romania 2002  2.1  2.7  1.3 
Mexico 2.4  3.4  1.0 
Poland 2.4  3.0  1.7 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Table A1.5 
State Control: Values of the Low-level Indicators 
 

















Australia 2.8  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0 
Austria 3.5  4.0  0.0  2.2  1.3 
Belgium 1.8  3.3  1.5  4.5  1.0 
Brazil 2.9  0.0  3.0  4.2  1.3 
Bulgaria 3.7  3.5  3.3  3.8  1.4 
Canada 2.8  2.1  0.8  1.3  2.0 
Czech Republic  3.8  3.2  2.3  2.3  1.3 
Denmark 2.5  2.3  0.8  1.4  0.0 
Finland 3.5  3.2  2.9  1.4  0.3 
France 4.5  4.1  1.9  3.0  0.3 
Germany 3.3  3.2  2.3  1.8  0.5 
Greece 3.0  3.8  0.9  5.1  2.3 
Hungary 3.5  3.0  4.8  2.3  2.0 
Iceland 2.3  2.8  0.7  0.0  0.3 
Ireland 2.5  2.6  0.8  3.8  0.8 
Italy 4.5  3.7  3.5  1.9  2.0 
Japan 2.0  0.0  0.6  3.0  2.5 
Korea 2.0  2.8  1.0  1.1  2.0 
Luxembourg 3.5  1.2  2.9  1.5  0.0 
Mexico 3.0  3.6  0.9  1.7  1.0 
Netherlands 2.8 2.8 2.0 1.7 0.3 
New Zealand  2.3  0.8  2.6  0.8  0.0 
Norway 4.8  4.0  2.4  2.2  0.8 
Poland 5.8  4.6  3.0  3.5  1.6 
Portugal 3.8  1.7  3.8  2.0  1.8 
Romania 2.9  4.8  4.4  2.3  1.1 
Romania 2002  4.5  5.0  4.5  3.1  2.6 
Slovak Republic  1.6  0.0  3.5  0.0  0.4 
Spain 3.5  2.5  2.3  4.4  0.8 
Sweden 3.7  2.7  0.7  2.3  1.0 
Switzerland 3.8 0.9 2.6 1.2 2.6 
Turkey 4.8  4.3  1.0  4.4  0.6 
United Kingdom  0.8  1.6  2.9  2.3  0.4 
United States  2.5  0.6  0.8  1.5  0.8 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).  Product Market Regulation in Romania: A Comparison with OECD Countries 
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Table A1.6 
 Barriers to entrepreneurship: Values of the Low-level Indicators 
 



















Australia 2.0  0.2  1.3  0.3 1.6  1.5 
Austria 0.0  0.5 3.0  3.4  0.3  1.0 
Belgium 4.0 0.3  1.8  1.7  1.6  0.0 
Brazil 2.0  0.6  0.5  1.3  2.0  0.0 
Bulgaria 2.0 0.3  1.4  1.9  1.1  0.0 
Canada 0.0 1.0  0.8 0.9  0.9  0.6 
Czech 
Republic 
4.0 0.5  3.0  2.2  1.4  0.0 
Denmark 4.0  0.0  1.0  0.3 1.4  1.9 
Finland 2.0  0.3  1.3 1.1  1.4  0.0 
France 2.0  0.3 2.0  1.6  2.2  1.1 
Germany 4.0  0.3  2.3  1.4 1.4  0.0 
Greece 0.0  1.1  2.3 2.9  1.6  0.0 
Hungary 0.0 0.5  2.3  2.0  1.6  0.9 
Iceland 4.0  0.7  1.3 1.6  2.3  0.0 
Ireland 4.0  0.2 0.8  0.3  0.9  0.0 
Italy 0.0  0.5  2.8  2.1  1.9  0.0 
Japan 2.0  0.3  1.5  2.3  1.4  0.3 
Korea 2.0  0.0  2.7  1.9  1.9  0.6 
Luxembourg 2.0  0.0  2.5  0.3  0.3  0.0 
Mexico 0.0  0.3 3.3  3.2  1.9  3.5 
Netherlands 4.0  0.9  2.0  1.3  1.9  0.0 
New Zealand  4.0  0.3  1.0  0.8  0.3  0.4 
Norway 2.0  0.2  1.0 0.9  2.2  0.0 
Poland 2.0  0.8 4.3  4.1  0.6  0.0 
Portugal 0.0 2.6  1.5  1.8  1.4  0.0 
Romania 0.0  0.1  0.8  0.8 2.0  0.0 
Romania 2002  4.0  0.0  1.0  1.4  0.0  0.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.0 1.4  2.0  1.9  0.6  0.0 
Spain 0.0  0.6  2.8  2.4  1.1  0.0 
Sweden 2.0 0.0  1.0 0.9  2.0  0.0 
Switzerland 6.0  0.0  2.3  0.8  2.2  0.0 
Turkey 6.0  0.5 2.3  3.2  1.4  0.0 
United 
Kingdom 
2.0 0.2  0.8  0.6  1.4  0.0 
United States  2.0  0.4  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.6 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Table A1.7 
 Barriers to Trade and Investment: Values  
of the Low-level Indicators 
   Ownership barriers  Discriminatory 
procedures  
Regulatory barriers  Tariffs  
Australia 2.4 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Austria  1.5 0.3 0.0  1.0 
Belgium 0.3 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Brazil  2.0 0.7 1.3  4.0 
Bulgaria 3.0 0.0 0.0  2.0 
Canada  2.9 0.5 0.0  1.0 
Czech  Republic  2.0 0.7 0.0  1.0 
Denmark  1.2 0.5 0.7  1.0 
Finland  1.5 0.0 0.0  1.0 
France  2.3 0.5 0.0  1.0 
Germany  0.3 0.7 0.7  1.0 
Greece  1.3 2.0 0.7  1.0 
Hungary 1.9 1.2 0.0  3.0 
Iceland  1.1 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Ireland  1.2 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Italy  2.8 0.7 0.0  1.0 
Japan  2.4 0.3 0.0  1.0 
Korea  2.2 0.0 0.0  3.0 
Luxembourg  1.5 0.3 0.0  1.0 
Mexico  2.8 1.4 0.0  6.0 
Netherlands  1.2 0.5 0.0  1.0 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Norway  1.9 0.3 0.7  0.0 
Poland  3.7 0.3 1.6  4.0 
Portugal 1.6 0.7 0.0  1.0 
Romania  0.8 0.0 0.0  5.0 
Romania  2002  2.0 1.2 0.7  5.0 
Slovak  Republic  2.3 1.1 1.6  1.0 
Spain  0.8 0.3 0.7  1.0 
Sweden 1.5 0.7 0.0  1.0 
Switzerland  2.0 1.1 0.0  1.0 
Turkey  3.1 0.7 0.0  3.0 
United  Kingdom  0.3 0.3 0.0  1.0 
United  States  1.8 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Note: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 
for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 